Introduction
The last fteen years have seen a remarkable revolution in both the conduct of and the common understanding of monetary policy around the world. This revolution has encompassed instruments, with an increased emphasis on transparency about short and medium run central bank policy planning and decreased em- The type of theoretical models of social value of information and optimal communication in strategic settings that we will describe assume away too much institutional detail and microfoundation to o er concrete lessons for the design of central bank policy. On the other hand, we believe it is fair to say that the theoretical models that monetary economists use to debate in ation targeting and transparency assume away too much about strategic interaction and expectations formation to adequately address the concrete questions. We would say { especially to our academics colleagues { that research has not caught up with the revolution in monetary policy practice, and there is much work to be done. However, the price level creates special di culties. There is a fundamental indeterminacy in the level of prices. When businesses set prices, they must form beliefs about how others are setting prices now and in the future. How others set prices will depend on what they think about in ation, and so on. When traders take positions in the nancial markets, they must form beliefs about the evolution of short run rates, knowing that short run interest rates in turn are in uenced by market expectations. Beliefs may be self-ful lling and -in the absence of good monetary policy { there may be excessive levels and volatility of in ation. Thus it is no coincidence that monetary policy in particular is subject to much commentary on how people are interpreting it, how they think others are interpreting it, and so on. There is a large coordination dimension with { in the absence of good monetary policy { much indeterminacy in outcomes.
Coordinating Expectations
Economists employ the suggestive metaphor of the \sunspot" to understand outcomes in such settings. Suppose that sunspot activity were observed by everyone in the economy, and when sunspot activity was high, economic actors expected in ation to be high and { we are still living in a world of bad monetary policy { this led them to set high prices which translated into high in ation. Whereas when sunspot activity was low, economic actors kept prices rises small and there was low in ation. In this world, sunspot activity has no intrinsic relevance for in ation. From the viewpoint of each individual actor, sunspot activity happens to be a good predictor of others' pricing behavior, and thus becomes an important determinant of their pricing decision.
Let us pause to ask what features of these metaphorical sunspots would allow them to coordinate expectations in this economy. we noted that they must be observed by everybody. But more is required: it must be common knowledge among actors in the economy that everyone is observing the sunspot, and everyone is acting on the sunspot in the same way. To stretch the metaphor further, there must also be a common understanding what is meant by \high sunspot activity" or \low sunspot activity". If some actors classi ed an intermediate level of sunspot activity as \high" while others classi ed it as \low", then sunspots would no longer be able to play their expectation coordination role. In short, there must be transparency about sunspots in order for them to coordinate expectations. Now enter the central bank. One way of summarizing the modern expectationalist view of central banking is to say central banks have successfully taken over the role of sunspots. If economic actors can be persuaded that it is a central bank announcement, rather than the level of sunspot activity, that will coordinate expectations about interest rates and prices, and thus determine interest rates and in ation, then here is a free instrument for the central bank that offers a more predictable and smoother way of in uencing outcomes than actually intervening in markets. The \e cacy of central banking as sunspots" requires that central bank pronouncements acquire the same features as sunspots outlined above: they must be observed by all, it must be common knowledge that they are observed by all and there must be common knowledge of the exact meaning of the pronouncements. In short, central bank communication must be transparent.
Of course, it is a little more complicated than that. The economists who use the metaphor of sunspots do not believe that it is actual sunspots that serve as equilibrium selection devices, nor that economic actors condition on completely payo irrelevant events. Rather, they think that economic actors could focus on a piece of news which is only a little bit payo relevant, and via its role in coordinating expectations, that piece of news could play the role of a sunspot.
Likewise, central bank announcements convey real information that is directly relevant to economic actors. In particular, they can or might convey information about current actions of the central bank, future actions of the central bank and the state of the economy. This information is relevant to economic actors, not just in assessing the variables that are the subject of the announcements, i.e., the bank's current and future actions and the state of the economy, but also about other variables, e.g., long run interest rates and asset prices. But { in an environment that is subject to self-ful lling expectations { it could play a role in coordinating expectations about long run interest rates and stock prices that is far greater than could be justi ed by the information content of the announcement. Indeed, this is simply to repeat the main claim of the modern expectation Ben Bernanke has argued that \when the monetary policy committee regularly provides information about its objectives, economic outlook, and policy plans, two bene ts result. First, with more complete information available, markets will price nancial assets more e ciently. Second, the policymakers will usually nd that they have achieved a closer alignment between market participants' expectations about the course of future short term rates and their own views."
In other words, Bernanke argues that (1) when the central bank conveys its own views more clearly, market prices will be more informationally e cient; but 
The Precision { Commonality Trade-O
In our discussion so far, we have assumed that if the central bank has some information, it is feasible for the central bank to make that information public.
We have noted that the \publicity" or common knowledge of the information enables it to have a large role in coordinating expectations, hopefully in the social interest (but conceivably not).
But as any central banker knows, it is not so easy to communicate information in such a way that it become common knowledge within the private sector.
If di erent listeners interpret an announcement di erently, then the content of the announcement does not become common knowledge. If some listeners pay attention to the announcement, while others do not, then the content of the announcement does not become common knowledge. Intuitively, the more one attempts to communicate, the more likely it is that some listeners will not pay attention to all the information, and the less common knowledge. In this sense, there is a trade-o between the commonality of information communicated and the accuracy of that information. This trade-o must surely arise in understanding the limits to transparency.
Many central bankers comment that markets may absorb unconditional forecasts of future policy, conditional forecasts are too much for the market to bear. One way of understanding this claim is that there is a greater hurdle in attaining common knowledge than merely conveying information to a single individual. An in ation target or unconditional forecast may be su cient simple for there to be con dence that \everyone" is observing it, but more complex communication strategies may erode common knowledge and { in this sense { lessen transparency.
Current Debates
How can we relate the theoretical ideas outlined above relate the current debates In addition to the argument that monetary policy is more e ective when central banks disclose the path of their future policy rates, there is also an argument that appeals to consistency. Rudebusch and Williams (2006) examine the current practice of some in ation-targeting central banks of arriving at the forecasts of in ation and output that are based either on the assmption that the policy rate will remain constant going forward, or using the path of the policy rate as revealed in market prices of short term interest rate futures contracts. If the central bank knows that its own forecast diverges from either or both of these paths, then the central bank's own forecast of in ation and output will build in an inconsistency.
Thus, in addition to the reasons arising from policy e ectiveness, even from the viewpoint of consistency, the disclosure of future expected policy actions is seen as being desirable.
Market as a single agent
There are, however, a number of issues that may give us cause to pause and reconsider the arguments. Begin, rst, with the practice of treating the market as a single, coherent agent with beliefs that satisfy the consistency requirements that apply to a rational individual. In referring to movements in market prices, There is no such attribution of irrationality, since there is no one individual called the \market" that can be the subject of such attribution. To think otherwise would be to commit what philosophers call a \category mistake" The expectations theory of the yield curve seems even less secure in the face of such evidence.
Monetary Policy and Informational E ciency
To the extent that market prices guide real economic decisions, the informational value of market prices ought to be of interest to central banks. Following the recent cooling of the residential housing market in the U. S., the excesses of the lending practices of some nancial institutions to the \sub-prime" mortgage market has become a subject of topical debate and a cause for concern. Many of the sub-prime loans were extended in the period of unusually low short-term interest rates earlier in the decade, illustrating the long-lasting nature of some investment and nancing decisions. As such, informational e ciency should be of concern to central bankers. In contrast to monetary models based on the IS curve that emphasizes ows (such as consumption ows), many important decisions a ected by monetary policy are concerned with stocks (such as debt).
Stock decisions can sometimes be di cult to reverse. rates somewhat further out are still lower than our forecast. The reason may be that market participants have a di erent perception of the interest rate path that is necessary to stabilise in ation at target and to achieve stable developments in output and employment. Alternatively, the market may have the same short-term interest rate expectations as Norges Bank, but because of extraordinary conditions long-term bond prices are being pushed up and, consequently, longterm bond yields are being pushed down."
Irving Fisher in his
investment can have a lingering e ect long after the initial misallocations.
Central bankers have a large impact on nancial markets. Indeed, it could be argued that the central bank's impact can sometimes be too large. By the nature of the problem, it is di cult to gauge whether the reactions in the nancial market is excessive or justi ed by the fundamentals. However, behavior of nancial intermediaries as illustrated above show that it cannot be taken for granted that informational e ciency will be guaranteed. Apparent \overreactions" will be the rule rather than the exception.
Conclusion
In the middle of the twentieth century, there was an earlier attempt to use transparent communication to coordinate private sector expectations to socially ecient outcomes. It was called \indicative planning". The idea was that missing markets might lead to market failures: in ve years time, if the manufacturing sector made the right investments, there would be an increased demand for steel;
if the new steel plants had been built, there would be supply to meet the demand.
But the lack of a future steel market meant that the invisible hand would not equate them in an e cient way. But if the planning agency could collect information from the managers of the manufacturing sector and the steel sector, and publicly and transparently announce this information, then they might be able to coordinate market expectations to a socially e cient level. A recent book by Barry Eichengreen (2006) gives an overview of the process and the outcomes.
In the event, the plans did not always work as intended. Coordination was evidently more di cult to achieve than this. Some of the problems of indicative planning are orthogonal to the new view of monetary policy (e.g., the relevant private sector entities would be large actors who would have an incentive to misreport their private information). Others might be more relevant (would an \indepen-dent" planning agency insulated from short term political considerations have performed better?) One of the lessons from the global games literature is that when the costs of miscoordination are large, the inherent strategic uncertainty about others' actions entails some degree of ine ciency in the outcome.
The public policy instrument of \coordinating expectations" through transparent communication has not always been a success. Yet it seems to be working 
